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ROBERT S. MARX LECTURE
RHETORIC·
AnthoTl)l T. Kronman··
"All the world's a stage ...."1
I.
What is the meaning of this ancient word? What sort ofactivity does
it describe? To which field of human experience should we assign it?
At the beginning ofPlato's Gorgias-the first philosophical examina-
tion of the subject-rhetoric is defined by Gorgias himself, a famous
teacher of the art, as a craft of"persuasion."2 This seems clear enough,
and is in line with what many people might say today. Rhetoric is the
art ofpersuading people to believe things, "the art ofspeaking or writing
effectively," as the dictionary tells US,3 and wherever persuasion is
needed, the art of rhetoric would seem to have a useful employment.
This ofcourse says nothing about the methods that rhetoric employs, or
how it achieves its intended effects, but it does define, in a preliminary
way, its field ofoperation.
On closer inspection, however, Gorgias's opening definition of
rhetoric as a craft ofpersuasion proves overly broad in two respects. It
ignores two distinctions that are crucial to Gorgias's own conception of
his craft and to our understanding of the most important question that
Plato's dialogue raises-the question ofwhether the art of rhetoric has
a legitimate function and its own distinct field of operation, or lacks
both, as Socrates argues. To understand this question, let alone attempt
an answer to it, we must first sharpen our definition of rhetoric by
limiting it to a narrower field than the bare concept of persuasion
implies, a field intermediate between two others in which persuasion is
prominent but rhetoric (as Gorgias conceived and practiced it) is
mIssmg.
An ofThand remark that Socrates makes in his initial exchange with
Gorgias suggests the first way in which the definition ofrhetoric as an art
* The Robert S. Marx Lecture, delivered at the University ofCincinnati College ofLaw, February
23, 1999.
** Dean, Yale Law School.
I. WIUJAM SHAKESPEARE, As YOU UKE IT, act 2, sc. 7.
2. PLATO, GORGIAS 453d (Terence IlWin trans., Clarendon Press 1979).
3. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1011 (1983).
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of persuasion is too broad. Socrates professes to be puzzled by this
definition and asks several questions that quickly cause Gorgias to agree
that rhetoric must indeed be defined more narrowly, as "the craft of
persuasion in jury-courts and in other mobs ... and about the things
which are just and unjust" (a statement that prompts Socrates to remark
that this is what he suspected Gorgias was talking about all along).""
Among the questions Socrates asks is this one: Is an arithmetician, a
person who practices the art of arithmetic, a craftsman of persuasion?
Gorgias answers that he is, but then concedes--without explanation or
argument-that the arithmetician is not a rhetorician, whose subject
matter and field of operation must therefore be .something other than
"the things belonging to number."5
Let us examine this concession more closely. It seems clear that
Gorgias is right to agree that arithmeticians (more generally, mathemati-
cians) practice an art ofpersuasion. Recall the example of the slaveboy
in the Meno, who "discovers," through Socrates's instruction, the
proposition that a square constructed on the diagonal of a square has
twice the area of the original figure.6 At first, the boy does not "see"
what Socrates is driving at, but through a series ofquestions and answers
Socrates unfolds a proof that brings the proposition "to light," so that
the boy can see it for himself. Socrates's proof leads the boy from
disbelief to conviction: it persuades. Indeed, that is the aim of every
mathematical proof-to persuade by making perspicuous, to demon-
strate, in the literal sense ofpointing out.
Not all proofs do this with equal success. Often, the same proposition
may be proved in different ways, but some or one of these proofs are
superior to the others on account of their ability to bring out with
greater lucidity and force the relationship between the assumptions and
conclusion of the argument. They are more persuasive. This is what
mathematicians mean when they describe a proof as elegant. They
mean that it displays the relations among the elements of the proofwith
a compelling simplicity and power. The construction of an elegant
proof is a real achievement. It demands art and the possession of a gift,
one mathematicians value highly. In this sense, Gorgias is right to
endorse Socrates's statement that arithmetic and the other branches of
mathematics constitute an art ofpersuasion.
4. PLATO, supra note 2, at 454b. Compan PLATO, PHAEDRUS 260e-261d Games H. Nichols,Jr.
trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1998) (discussing the definition of rhetoric as an art of persuasion in public
proceedings).
5. PLATO, supra note 2, at 453e-454a.
6. See PLATO, MENO 82b-85b (G.M.A. Grube trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1976).
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J3ut the mathematician's art ofpersuasion differs, in two basic ways,
from Gorgias's own, and these differences explain why he impliedly
concedes that the mathematician is not a practitioner of rhetoric. First,
the truths the mathematician persuades us to accept are immutable and
indubitable. They are the same for everyone, at all times, and though
they initially may be difficult to grasp, the truths ofmathematics possess
a unique self-evidence and transparency. By contrast, the sorts of truths
that Gorgias persuades his audiences of jurymen and legislators to
embrace are variable and contested. Regarding truths of this
kind-those pertaining to "the things which are just and un-
just"-disagreement is perpetual, and there is no prospect of ever
reaching points ofsetded understanding comparable to those on which
the science of mathematics rests. Furthermore, the truths for which
Gorgias argues must be modified to fit the varying circumstances of
h~man life. They must be trimmed and shaped to the conditions at
hand: to the temperament of a people, the threat of the moment, the
peculiarities ofthe litigants and their special dispute--unlike mathemati-
cal truths which display, and will allow, no variability of this sort. (Both
in the Gorgias and elsewhere, Socrates challenges this distinction and
defends a view ofjustice which holds that its truths too are transparent
and eternal, like those of mathematics. But this is not Gorgias's view,
the one we are exploring at the moment, and it compels us to accept the
dramatic claim that neither politics as a field ofactivity, nor rhetoric as
the art of persuasion appropriate to it, have any legitimate separate
existence of their own. I shall return to Socrates's challenge shordy.)
Second, the art of persuasion that Gorgias practices in politics and
law involves the arousal and deployment of various passions-anger,
pride, contempt, shame, and love, among others-to establish belief in
the correctness of the position he is advocating. Indeed, one might say
that Gorgias's art consists, above all else, in the mobilization and
direction ofhuman passions toward this end. By contrast, the mathemati-
cian's art of persuasion does not engage--it does not need to en-
gage--the passions in a similar way. A teacher ofmathematics does not
need to arouse feelings of ange~ or shame in his students in order to
persuade them of the correctness of a proof. Far from being necessary
to his task, the passions are for a teacher of mathematics a nuisance or
interference that must be disengaged and put aside, at least temporarily,
if his students are to be able to pay attention to the proof and see the
truth that it discloses. Gorgias arouses his listeners; the passions are his
allies and tools. The mathematician seeks to make his listener be still,
and regards the passions as a bother that can only block and cloud the
state of conviction his art ofpersuasion aims to achieve.
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For these two reasons, it is understandable that Gorgias should
distinguish the art ofpersuasion he calls rhetoric from the very different
kind ofpersuasion that mathematicians practice. This distinction marks
a first delimitation of the field of rhetoric. It establishes a boundary
between politics and law, where the passions must be engaged for the
sake of establishing belief in uncertain truths, and mathematics, where
the passions need to be neutralized so that truths of perfect certainty
may be discovered.
But there is a second boundary that must be drawn if we are to
understand the intermediate nature of the field that Gorgias conceives,
however inarticulately, to be the proper domain of his craft. This
second boundary first comes to light in Socrates's exchange with Polus,
Gorgias's younger disciple, who takes over the argument after Socrates
has brought the good-natured Gorgias around to agreeing that a true
rhetorician "is powerless to use his rhetoric unjusdy, or to be willing to
do injustice"7-a position plainly at odds with Gorgias's own experience,
and with that of every lawyer and politician since.
Polus asks Socrates to tell the group listening to the conversation what
kind of craft he thinks rhetoric is. Socrates answers that rhetoric is, in
his view, a "certain knack" for producing "gratification and pleasure."B
He describes it as a form of "flattery"g and analogizes rhetoric to
cooking, another of the flattering arts. This is a deliberately insulting
comparison, and to understand the insult we need to pause for a
moment and explore the assumption on which it is based.
Cooking is an art that caters to our appetite for food. It seeks to
satisfy that appetite, but also to stimulate it by producing new and
pleasing sensations of taste. Some cooks even try to redirect our
appetites, to cause us to enjoy dishes we did not like (or did not think we
liked) before. Julia Child is such a cook. Over many years, she has not
only introduced the American people to many new dishes, but has
transformed our eating habits, our likes and dislikes in the realm of
food. 1o
This is a significant achievement, one that requires great art as well
as a natural gift for cooking. It may also be described as a kind of
persuasion. Julia Child has persuaded us to change the way we eat. At
a lesser level, every cook might be said to practice an art ofpersuasion.
When I set a dish before my children, I hope they will be
7. PLATO, supra note 2, at 461a.
8. ld. at 462b.
9. Id. at 463b.
10. See DianeJohnson, AmericlUl Pie, 44 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS No. 20 (1997) (reviewing biography
ofJulia Child).
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moved-persuaded-by the way it looks and smells and tastes, to eat it.
Ifthey reject it, I have failed in my effort to persuade them. A successful
cook is one who knows how to practice this particular art ofpersuasion,
and a great cook, likeJulia Child, knows how to practice it not just with
respect to individual dishes, but at the higher level ofa whole cuisine.
In all these respects, the art of cooking resembles that of consumer
advertising. Like the cook, the advertiser aims to stimulate, to satisfy
and even to transform the tastes of his audience. His goal is to please
them, sometimes by gratifying the tastes they have and sometimes by
awakening new tastes whose gratification is then provided. But these
arts-those of the cook and the advertiser-differ from the art of the
rhetorician in two crucial respects.
First, the idea of truth plays a much smaller role in cooking and
advertising than it does in politics and law. In the latter fields, appeals
to the truth are a familiar, indeed essential, feature of debate. The
rhetorician insists it is true that his client is innocent, and true that
Athens will be more secure if it builds a wall around its harbor. The
rhetorician's aim is to establish belief in the truth of these propositions,
and toward that end he arouses the passions of his audience and seeks
to turn them in a certain direction. Everything the rhetorician does
depends upon the intelligibility of truth claims of this sort, however
difficult they may be to establish and however resistant to persuasion his
audience remains.
By contrast, truth plays a far more limited role, if any at all, in the
field ofcooking. A cook may claim that one dish-or cuisine-is better
than another. But this is either a nonsensical idea (some people just like
kale more than cabbage, or Chinese food more than Italian), or it is
simply a way ofpersuading someone to taste something new, in which
case the relationship of truth and taste is the reverse of what it is in
rhetoric, since the rhetorician shapes taste for the sake ofpromoting a
belief concerning the truth, whereas the cook promotes a belief
regarding the truth for the sake ofshaping taste.
Second, the tastes the rhetorician shapes-the passions he awakens
and deploys-are different from those a cook seeks to gratify. Anger,
pride, contempt, shame, and love are all social passions. Each is a
feeling that includes, as one of its components, a real or imagined
relation to another person. Each is in this respect nascently political,
which is why they may be directed toward political ends. The feelings
that a cook aims to arouse and satisfy, by contrast, are essentially private
in nature. I can experience them by myself, in isolation from others.
Even Robinson Crusoe can enjoy a good burgundy (if one should wash
up on his shore) and tell the difference between it and a poor one. To
be sure, part of the normal pleasure of eating is eating with others.
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Eating is for us a social activity-this is one of the things that distin-
guishes us from most other animals-and solitary dining is usually less
satisfying than eating in the company ofone's family and friends. I I But
even when the social pleasure of eating together is subtracted, the
consumption of food yields a real if reduced pleasure of its own, in
contrast, for example, to the pleasurable feeling of pride, which can
never exist except in the actual or imagined company of others.
In these two ways, the art ofcooking differs from that of rhetoric, and
the point ofSocrates's comparison ofrhetoric with cooking is to suggest
that this difference is unreal-that the rhetorician, like a cook, in reality
produces only private pleasures unconnected to the truth "about the
things which are just and unjust." But this is not Gorgias's own view of
his craft. On Gorgias's understanding of it, the art of rhetoric is as
different from cooking as it is from mathematics. The craft that Gorgias
knows and practices, and teaches to his students, occupies an intermedi-
ate position between these two other arts. Unlike mathematics, rhetoric
is concerned with truths that are variable and obscure, and permanently
subject to dispute, and it employs the passions as instruments of
persuasion. Unlike cooking, it starts from the assumption that there are
meaningful truths "about the things which are just and unjust," and
seeks to persuade others of these truths by means of passions that are
social rather than private in· nature. Gorgias's craft stands between
mathematics and cooking, and can neither be elevated to the one nor
demoted to the other. .
The special domain ofrhetoric, Gorgias tells us, is that ofcourts and
legislative assemblies-the world ofpolitics and law. This is where the
art of rhetoric has its place and proper function. It is obvious that
Gorgias understands the realm of politics and law to occupy an
intermediate space between the passionless certitudes of mathematics,
on the one hand, and the truthless pleasures of cooking on the
other-just like the art of rhetoric itself, and for the very same reasons.
Consequently, if the arguments of lawyers and politicians can be
formulated with mathematical precision, or if these same arguments
prove in reality to be no different from the tasty treats a cook prepares,
then we must not only abandon the idea-Gorgias's idea-that the art
of rhetoric occupies a separate space between the activities ofcounting
and cooking, but we must also give up the belief that politics and law
occupy a space of this sort as well. The first and most important
question to ask about the art of rhetoric, therefore, is whether this
II. For an interesting discussion of the social dimension of eating, and of the employment of
rhetoric to shape it, see NORBERT EUAS, THE CIVlUZING PROCESS 70-129 (EdmundJephcott trans.,
1978).
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intermediate space does in fact eXist, as Gorgias assumes but fails to
establish in his exchange with Socrates, for the answer to this question
will determine the status not only of rhetoric but of politics and law
themselves.
Broadly speaking, Aristotle's answer to this question is "yes," and the
tradition of political thought that derives from his treatises on politics
and rhetoric begins with this basic assumption. 12 . But there are two
competing traditions that answer the question in the negative. Each of
these denies the independence and legitimacy of rhetoric, politics, and
law as Gorgias conceives them, and the negative answers they give are
already intimated in the opening pages of the Gorgias.
II.
The first of these traditions, w~ch has had representatives in every
age, starts from the claim that the basic questions of politics and law
have answers that possess the same clarity and finality as the answers to
mathematical questions, and can be arrived at by a process as free of
passion as the process of mathematical reasoning itself. The perennial
hope expressed by this view is plain enough: that politics and law, which
seem doomed to endless contestation and strife, may be arranged in
accordance with principles and procedures to whiCh there is universal
assent, that the rules ofgovernment can be rescued from the antagonism
that surrounds them and permanently fixed with the same calm
agreement as the rules of arithmetic and geometry.
In Plato's Protagoras, for example, Socrates argues, in an exchange
with the most famous rhetorician of his youth, that the "salvation" of
humanity lies in the application of "the art of measurement" to all
problems ofgood and evil,13 which Socrates recharacterizes in terms of
pleasure and pain. No one, Socrates says, knowingly does evil-a
famous Socratic assertion. Those who do evil do so mistakenly. They
are misled by appearances, taking something which appears good, but
is actually evil, to be good in fact. The arts of measurement and
counting, Socrates insists, are the best techniques that have ever been
discovered for correcting errors of this kind, for counteracting the
misleading impression ofappearances, and we will only be saved from
the bickering and disagreement that plague the subject ofgood and evil
in human affairs, he concludes, when this subject, too, has been
12. The main elements of this tradition are well summarized in J.G.A PoCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENTpt. I, at 3-80 (1975).
13. PLATO, PROTAGORAS 356d-e (C.C.W. Taylor trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1996).
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reviewed and revised in accordance With the techniques ofmeasurement
and counting, when our political and legal arguments have been
disciplined by mathematical methods. Socrates does not indicate in the
Protagoras how hopeful he thinks we should be that this will happen, and
in other, later dialogues,14 Plato puts words in his mouth that suggest a
different conception of political argument, one closer to the view that
Gorgias, Protagoras, and other rhetoricians of the time held (or might
have held ifthey had developed their positions with Plato's philosophical
acuity). But the mathematization ofpolitics that Socrates recommends
in the Protagoras has continued to have supporters through the present
day.
At the start of the modem period, for example, Thomas Hobbes
defends this view with a forcefulness that few, ifany, have ever matched.
Educated in the Renaissance humanist culture oflate sixteenth century
England, a culture that placed tremendous stress on the importance and
value of rhetoric, Hobbes later formulated the ambition to construct a
new account of politics and law more geometrico, having had an "epiph-
. any" at the age offorty (so his biographer Aubrey tells us) while reading
Euclid's Elements, and resolving to invent a political science that would
possess the same demonstrative clarity as its mathematical counterpart. 15
In De Give and The Elements Hobbes energetically attacks all the
principal assumptions on which the humanist respect for rhetoric was
based: the assumption that the character ofa speaker is relevant to the
persuasiveness of his speech; that prudential wisdom based upon
historical and personal experience is the highest form ofwisdom to be
found in the realm of law and politics; and that eloquence is a needed
and useful instrument in political argument. In opposition to these
claims, Hobbes argues that the validity of any proposition, including
those ofa political sort, must be established by the arguments supporting
it and without reference to the character of its advocate. He asserts that
a true science of politics can be constructed through the logical
exposition of the meaning of words and of the relations among these
meanings, and insists that a political science of this sort will exhibit a
certainty and finality that no experiential knowledge can possess. And
he argues that eloquence has no more place in the defense of a political
scheme than it does in an astronomer's explanation of his view of
celestial motion. In making these arguments, Hobbes is deliberately
seeking to demote the art of rhetoric from the privileged position his
humanist predecessors had assigned it, and to banish rhetoric from
14. See PLATO, l'HAEDRUS,JUpra nOle 4, a1245a.
15. See QUENTIN SKINNER, REAsON AND RHE'roRIC IN1lIE PHILoSOPHY OF HOBBFli 250 (1996).
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serious political debates, which henceforth must be settled, he claims, in
the same way mathematical controversies are-without reliance on
eloquence of expression or prudential arguments drawn from experi-
ence, and without reference to the personal traits of the advocates
themselves.
In his brilliant analysis of Hobbes's assault on the art of rhetoric,
Quintin Skinner points out that in the Leviathan, written twenty-six years
after De Give, Hobbes not only offers a revised and significantly more
favorable account of rhetoric, but himself employs its classical tech-
niques to persuade his readers. Skinner speculates that Hobbes's
disappointment at having failed to prevent a civil war in England by
logical arguments alone caused him to revalue the art of rhetoric, and
in particular to set a higher value on both prudence and eloquence,
returning, in this way, to an outlook closer to that of the humanist
culture in which he was raised. 16 But whatever one makes of the shift
from De Give to Leviathan, or of Skinner's explanation for it, Hobbes's
early attempt to build a science ofpolitics rivaling that of nature in its
precision and finality remains a magnificent expression ofthe wish to rid
the realm of politics of the passions and uncertainties that are the
preconditions of rhetorical argument and the foundation of its claim to
be a separate and legitimate art.
Two centuries later, we find Jeremy Bentham working in this same
anti-rhetorical tradition. In the Preface to An Introduction to the Principles
ofMorals and Legislation, Bentham writes that the "truths that form the
basis of political and moral science are not to be discovered but by
investigations as severe as mathematical ones,"I? a remark that seems
especially apt in light of his repeated characterization of all moral and
political problems as problems ofcounting. According to Bentham, the
aim ofevery legislator ought to be the greatest happiness of the greatest
number, a political ideal expressed in mathematical terms and requiring
the application of mathematical methods. The apparent variety of
pleasures and pains can. easily suggest that the qualitative differences
among them makes their quantitative comparison impossible, and hence
rules out the politics of measurement that Bentham recommends. But
Bentham insists that this conclusion is mistaken and warns that if we
accept it, the most important political debates will remain incapable of
clear resolution.
If the discipline of legislation is ever to achieve the same scientific
stature as mathematics, he argues, we must avoid careless psychological
16. Sa itJ. at 426-38.
17. JEREMY BENTIIAM, An InJroductiDn to the Principals tifMorals and LegislatWn, in ABENTIIAM READER
85 (Mary Peter Mack ed., 1969).
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assumptions and the careless definitions that correspond to them.
Above all else, he says, we need clarity and simplicity in our conception
of the human will and in our use ofwords to describe it. Otherwise we
will be lost in a thicket of confusions, where fallacies and fictions
abound. These are the instruments of those who cannot reason clearly,
the devices of men who are misled by superficial appearances and
corrupted by a belief in authority. They are the instruments of rhetoric,
which Bentham attacks with evangelical intensity, especially in the
common law, where the techniques of rhetoric have, he claims, their
most pernicious employment.
Like the Socrates of the Protagoras, Bentham insists that mankind will
be delivered from its ceaseless arguments about good and evil, justice
and injustice, only when the legislator becomes a calculator, carefully
summing the pains and pleasures ofdifferent policies, and guarding his
reason against the confused images of the rhetorician's emotionally
arousing appeals. Only then, Bentham argues, will our minds be clear
enough to recognize the confusion and suffering these appeals have
caused, and calm enough to reject the rhetorician's guileful craft as an
enormous impediment to the rational advancement ofhuman happiness
on earth. John Rawls's great book, A Theory ofJustice, is an important
contemporary expression ofthis same anti-rhetorical view. At the center
of Rawls's argument is a rhetorical device-the image of a "veil of
ignorance" and of the "original position" from which we are to imagine
ourselves choosing a basic structure for society. IS The main function of
this device is to rule out appeals to self-interest, to specific conceptions
of the good, and to the demands of our actual historical situation, by
depriving us ofthe knowledge on which such appeals are based. Behind
the veil of ignorance, knowing nothing about our interests or concep-
tions of the good or location in historical time, we can neither advance
nor respond to arguments based on any of these considerations.
But all rhetorical arguments start from one or another of these
premises, and so the effect of embracing the constraints on argument
imposed by the veil' of ignorance is to eliminate the space within which
rhetoric exists. That is ofcourse the intended effect ofRawls's rhetorical
device: to prepare the way for a politics of reason whose first principles
are ones every rational person embraces and which neither depend
upon nor are vulnerable to the passionate appeals of the rhetorician.
The influence of Rawls's book makes plain how powerful this ancient,
anti-rhetorical ambition remains today.
18. JOHN RAWU;, ATHEORYOFJUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
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The tradition to which Hobbes, Bentham, and Rawls belong,
however, is only one of two that challenge the legitimacy of rhetoric as
Gorgias conceives it. On Gorgias's view, rhetoric is a discipline for
mobilizing the social passions for the sake ofbelief in a contestable truth
whose validity can never be demonstrated with mathematical finality.
The tradition of thought represented by the Socrates of the Protagoras,
and by all his intellectual descendants, maintains that it is realistic to
hope for a finality of just this sort in political debate, and possible
-indeed, only possible-to achieve it by repudiating the art of rhetoric
with its inflammatory images and techniques. To accept this view is to
deny the premise on which Gorgias's conception of his craft is based.
But one can undermine this conception in an opposite way, by
denying that there are any moral or political truths, even contestable
ones, for the sake of belief in which the passions need to be mobilized.
Ifno such truths exist, then whatever the rhetorician says about his craft,
it can never be anything but a species offlattery, the embellishment and
promotion of interests, an instrument ofpower, pure and simple, whose
appeals to the truth must themselves be understood as an exercise of
power or an attempt to acquire power, not in the service of truth but for
the sake of power alone. If no moral or political truths exist, then
Gorgias and his students must either be lying or confused when they say
that their arguments are meant to persuade us to a belief in the truth,
even a contestable truth of the kind that politics and law appear to
permit.
Hobbes attempts to abolish the art of rhetoric by lifting the truths of
politics up into a higher realm, where the rhetorician's art is unneeded,
indeed destructive. But rhetoric can be abolished in a second way, by
demoting the contestable truths ofpolitics to the level of mere interests,
of appetites and powers, where the art of rhetoric may still have a useful
employment, but not the one that Gorgias claims for it-an employ-
ment whose usefulness in fact demands either ignorance or dishonesty
on the part of the rhetorician.
III.
This second line ofthought, equally hostile to Gorgias and his art, has
also had defenders in every age, beginning with Callicles, the first great
philosopher of power, who midway through Plato's Gorgias enters the
argument to claim that "right" and "law" and ')~stice"-therhetori-
cian's stock in trade-are nothing but the tools used by weak men, who
form the majority in every community, to constrain the few naturally
strong ones among them and to prevent them from exercising their
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superior powers. 19 Callicles ridicules the powerlessness ofphilosophers
like Socrates, who live "whispering with three or four boys in a
corner,,,20 and are utterly unable to defend themselves when attacked in
the law courts and assemblies. A real man-"a free man, great and
powerful"21-knows how to fight back. He knows how to use the idiom
of the law, the vocabulary ofright and law and justice, to protect himself
against the many, who seek to overcome their natural weakness through
the artificial power of the law. A lawsuit is, on Callicles's view, nothing
but a power struggle, and the art ofrhetoric, which the many use against
the few and the few must learn to use defensively against the many, is
nothing but an ensemble of techniques for achieving victory in this
power struggle.
In response, Socrates attempts to persuade Callicles (without much
success) that a philosophical life, which aims at the truth and a proper
arrangement of the soul, and abjures the techniques of rhetoric and the
pandering these involve, is the best of all possible lives, even if the
person living it lacks the power to defend himself in court and is put to
death by his fellows. In the exchange between them, Socrates's
repudiation of the art of rhetoric is explicit. But Callicles's own
endorsement of the art constitutes a repudiation as well, at least if we
conceive the art as Gorgias does, for the reduction ofrhetoric to a means
ofpromoting one's power eliminates the very thing that gives the craft
its dignity and honor on Gorgias's view-the rhetorician's responsibility
to use his skills for the sake ofjustice.
"[T]he rhetor is powerful at speaking against anyone about any-
thing," Gorgias says, "so as to be more persuasive among masses of
people about, in short, whatever he wants; but that is no more reason
why he should steal their reputation either from the doctors,just because
he has the power to do that, or from the other craftsmen, but he should
use rhetoric justly as well ... .'>22 From Callicles's perspective, this is a
ridiculously naive statement-either· that, or a cynical attempt to
enhance the power of rhetoric through a pretended commitment to
justice. In either case, on Callicles's view, the appeal that Gorgias
makes to the idea ofjustice cannot be understood in its own terms, nor
can the art of rhetoric itself, for the demotion of the idea ofjustice to a
mere instrument ofpower deprives the art of rhetoric of the very thing
that gives it moral and political legitimacy in the eyes ofits practitioners.
If anything, Callicles holds Gorgias in even greater contempt than
19. Sa PLATO, supra note 2, at 483a-484a.
20. Id. at 485e.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 457a-b.
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Socrates does, and Gorgias-if he understands his own posItIOn
righdy-has even stronger reasons for rejecting Callicles's nihilism than
he does for resisting Socrates's invitation to abandon the art of rhetoric
in favor ofphilosophy.
In our own age, the proposition that appeals to truth and justice must
be understood as disguised displays ofpower is most closely associated
with the philosophy ofFriedrich Nietzsche, to whom the great classicist
E.R. Dodds compared Callicles in a thoughtful essay forty years ago.23
Nietzsche's own philosophy of power is subde and complex, and at
points, perhaps, even self-contradictory. But one idea stands out clearly
in his attempted "revaluation ofall values.,,24
Nietzsche insists that the ideals of truth and justice to which moralists
and judges appeal are inventions whose purpose is to intimidate the
naturally strong into ceding their power and accepting the peaceable
constrains of the law-that the function oflaw and morality is to tame
the lion and turn him into a child.25 "Truth" and ')ustice" are in reality,
Nietzsche says, the weapons of the poor, of the ordinary mass of men
who have only these subversive ideas to counter the beauty and vitality
and cleverness of the gifted few. They are the weapons with which the
slave revolt in moralitl6 is accomplished-instruments of power that
plebeian thinkers like Socrates andJesus use to crush a once-dominant
aristocracy of valor, beauty, and brains. Of course, these plebeian
weapons work only because the naturally well-endowed themselves
embrace the ideas of truth and justice, with their leveling implications
(that truth is the same for everyone, and justice a norm of equality).
Why the well-off-the brave and beautiful and clever few-should
accept the authority ofthese ideas, offered up by the '!lngifted many, and
why they should in the end be willing to sacrifice their own spectacular
advantages for the sake of fidelity to these ideas, is a mystery that
Nietzsche never entirely solves. But he insists that we genealogists, "we
finders ofknowledge,"27 must not accept these ideas ourselves ifwe are
to see them for what they are-instruments for the management of life
in a world that threatens to squash us, and for the consolidation of
power, especially by the many against the few.
23. See PlATO, GORGIAS app. 387-91 (E.R. Dodds ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1959).
24. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, TwiJighJ oflhe ldolr, in THE PoRTABLE NIETZSCHE 465 (Walter
Kaufman ed. & trans., Viking Press 1954) (emphasis omitted).
25. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, 17tusSpoke<'araJhustm pt. I, in THE PoRTABLE NIETZSCHE 137-40
(Walter Kaufman ed. & trans., Viking Press 1954).
26. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GENFALOGY OF MORAlS 34 (Horace B. Samuel trans., T.N.
Foulis 1913).
27. See id. at 5.
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Lawyers and judges invoke the idea ofjustice, and politicians appeal
to the truth.. But we must understand their words and actions in the
perspective of power, as an expression of the will to power that
constitutes the very being of beings, on Nietzsche's final, grand,
metaphysical conception of it. To see the realm of rhetoric in this
perspective, however, is to reject Gorgias's own view ofrhetoric as either
hopelessly naive or deliberately dishonest, and in either case not what
he claims it to be. No philosopher has had a deeper appreciation of
rhetoric than Nietzsche, and none has been a greater practitioner of the
art. But no philosopher has ever offered a view of the world more
hostile to Gorgias's own naive conception ofhis craft, an hostility which
in Nietzsche's case rises to a metaphysical level.
Michel Foucault's work, whose influence has been enormous,
continues in this same line of thought. Foucault is interested in the
shaping influence-the constitutive force--ofideas and systems ofideas,
of ideologies and patterns of thinking. He is interested in the relation-
ship of"words)) (idioms, vocabularies, images, disciplines of thought) to
"things" (objects, institutions, practices, the world in general). A
fundamental premise of Foucault's work is that "words)) shape "things,))
that our ways of speaking, our habits of expression and the modes of
thought they express, constitute the order of things, that they determine
the organization of the world by establishing and validating its division
into various disciplines, authorities, jurisdictions and the like.28
Put differendy, the world, for Foucault, is a rhetorical structure. It
possesses no antecedent order of its own, but acquires one only through
the constitutive organizing power of "words.)) But a second and equally
fundamental premise ofFoucault's work is that the "words)) which give
the world its shape are themselves the infinitely varied manifestation of
a single basis drive-of the drive to control, which expresses itself, at
different times, as the drive to arrange, subdue, classify, explain, direct,
discipline, and even (paradoxically) to sacrifice.29 For Foucault, the
world is a rhetorical structure and rhetoric the expression ofa universal,
primordial will to powe~a view that compels us to reimagine every
contest of ideas, every conflict between competing claims of truth and
justice, as a contest ofpower in which victory is determined not by the
moral or epistemic soundness of their views, but by the contestants'
28. Seegeneral!J MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., Tavistock Publications 1972); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY
OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES (R.D. Laing ed., Pantheon Books 1970).
29. Ste general!J MiCHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPUNE AND PuNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRiSON (Alan
Sheridan ed., Pantheon Books 1977).
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relative strength (their endurance, charisma, commitment, influence and
the like).
In one sense, Foucault elevates rhetoric to a position of supreme
importance. The world, he says, is constituted by our words and the
way we use them. But in another sense, Foucault abolishes the craft of
rhetoric as Gorgias-and the lawyers and politicians who are his
descendants-understand it, for on Foucault's view the rhetorician's
appeal to truth and justice can only be an exercise ofpower in disguise,
something Gorgias cannot concede without abandoning his claim to be
the practitioner ofa craft whose usefulness and legitimacy depend upon
its having a real relation to these ideals. In this second sense, Foucault
extends and amplifies the attack on rhetoric that Callicles begins, and
gives it more contemporary appeal. But it is the same line ofargument,
as devastating to Gorgias as Callicles's own much simpler formulation
ofit, and to accept it (as many today do) is to abolish the craft ofrhetoric
from below.
IV.
Gorgias makes only a brief appearance at the start of the Platonic
dialogue named after him. He quickly leaves the stage and is followed
by his student Polus, and then by Callicles, with whom Socrates has
much longer exchanges. Gorgias himself does not offer a developed
account of the art of rhetoric, nor does he seem able to defend the
dignity and importance ofhis craft against the two attacks on it that are
mounted in the Gorgias and which have long subsequent histories down
to the present day. .
The first of these, the attack from above, argues for a politics of
reason whose indisputable truths can only be obscured by the rhetori-
cian's passionate appeals. This is the position that Socrates defends.
The second, the attack from below, insists that the rhetorician's
invocation of truth and justice is a sham, a technique for gaining power
whose success requires that its practitioners either fail to understand
what they are doing or deliberately conceal it. This is the line ofattack
forcefully pressed by Callicles, one of the most magnificent and
disturbing figures in all of Plato's dialogues. Gorgias stands between
these two, between Socrates and Callicles, and the question is, does he
have any ground on which to stand? Does the craft of rhetoric have a
separate and legitimate place in human life, in between pure reason and
pure power? Or does Gorgias's belief that rhetoric is a distinct art with
a valuable function of its own rest upon a mistake, as both Socrates and
Callicles (whose views are otherwise so sharply opposed) contend?
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This is not a small question, for more is involved than the status of
rhetoric itself, understood as a specialized set of techniques for persua-
sion in political and legal disputes. The status ofpolitics and law is also
at stake. If our political and legal affairs can be arranged, as Socrates
claims, on the basis ofan understanding as certain as our knowledge of
"the things belonging to number," then politics and law must be
absorbed into the superior enterprise ofphilosophy. Ifpolitics and law
are just modalities ofpower, as Callicles argues, then their practitioners,
who are constandy invoking the ideas oftruth andjustice, are either liars
or fools, and the whole realm of political and legal action must be
absorbed into in a more encompassing, indeed universal, will to power.
On either view of law and politics-the Socratic or the Calliclean-
these pursuits lose their distinctness and legitimacy, for the very same
reason that the art of rhetoric loses its.
The question ofwhether Gorgias has any ground on which to stand,
between the expansionary realms of reason and power, is thus indistin-
guishable from the question ofwhether politics and law can themselves
be shown to occupy a defensible space between these two domains. The
questions are the same, and any argument which supports Gorgias's
belief that the art of rhetoric has a distinct and valuable function of its
own will therefore also provide support for the view that law and politics
constitute an intermediate domain sufficiendy distinct to withstand ~e
imperial claims of both reason and power. To defend Gorgias's
conception of rhetoric against Socrates's and Callicles's attacks on it is
at the same time to defend the independence ofpolitics and law against
the two-sided threat of abolition from above and below.
Let us recall, in a bit more detail, the view of rhetoric that Gorgias
holds. Gorgias himself never develops his own ideas fully; he never is
given the chance. But the following account captures the essence of his
view, which most practicing lawyers and politicians still hold today.
The rhetorician defends various positions in legislative and judicial
debates. In the course ofdefending them, he makes claims about their
truth and justice. These claims are an essential part of his defense. But
they are also always contestable. Others can always challenge them and
defend competing claims of their own. It may be that a particular claim
seems, at a given moment, either obvious or absurd, but no argument
pertaining to the truth orjustice ofa legal or political position can ever
be proved or disproved with the finality that mathematical arguments
can.
Furthermore, in political and legal disputes, unlike mathematical
ones, the passions must be mobilized for the sake ofpersuasion. Only
ifthe passions are aroused and directed toward the end ofsecuring belief
in the truth or justice of one's claim, can a belief of this kind be
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produced and made strong enough to withstand attack. In this sense,
the passions playa necessary role in political and legal persuasion, and
the rhetorician's art includes a knowledge ofhow to engage and direct
them.
But this same knowledge also enables the practitioner of rhetoric to
mobilize the passions for the sake of belief in claims that are false or
unjust. There can be no secure belief in what is true and just unless and
until the passions are engaged, but their engagement does not guarantee
that persuasion will lead in this direction. It may lead in the opposite
direction, toward falsehood and injustice. The rhetorician, who is a
master of motivation, also controls its direction, and thus has a duty to
use his craft for proper ends, for the promotion of truth and justice,
though in an arena where the meaning of these ideas remains unclear
and will forever be contested.
These are the main elements ofGorgias's conception ofrhetoric, and
they express the unreflective view of their craft that most lawyers and
politicians have always held. Can these elements be brought together
in a philosophical defense of rhetoric that preserves its independence
and legitimacy from the two lines ofattack I have described? The first
step in constructing such a defense is to ask what must be true about us,
as human beings, if the craft ofrhetoric is to possess the distinctness and
dignity Gorgias assigns it. What must our condition be if the appeals
that rhetoricians make to a real though contested truth and jus-
tice-appeals that transcend mere interest and power, like the argu-
ments of mathematicians, but unlike them, can never definitively be
resolved-are to. be possible at all? And what must the human
condition be if the securing ofour beliefs regarding truth and justice in
the middle realm of politics and law is to depend upon an artful
mobilization of the passions that is always also capable ofproducing the
opposite result?
I have given these questions what philosophers call a transcendental
form. A transcendental question asks about the conditions necessary for
the possibiliry ofsomething else-in this case, the possibility of rhetoric,
politics, and law. More specifically, I have framed my questions as ones
of transcendental anthropology, as questions about human nature and
not (as Kant did) about rational beings in general, or beings capable of
experience30 (a category that certainly includes us, but is wider than the
human category).
30. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PuRE REAsON A95·96 (Norman Kemp Smith trans.,
1929). But see EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY 'lM!25·33 Gohn Wild et aI. eds., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970).
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To establish the transcendental conditions of rhetoric is not to show
that rhetoric is alive and well today, or even to describe the broad
circumstances in which it can flourish. It is not to sketch-it is not even
to begin to sketch-a system of rhetoric that oudines and arranges
different methods ofpersuasion. It most certainly is not to evaluate the
performance of different politicians and lawyers. All of these tasks
belong to the domain ofrhetoric. They are part of its internal life. The
transcendental questions I have posed aim only to establish the
possibility of such a domain in the first place, to secure its claim to a
legitimate existence of its own.
I say "only to establish," but in a logical sense, ofcourse, that must be
the first order of business. For until the domain of rhetoric has been
secured against the assaults of reason and power which threaten to
destroy it from above and below, all of these other tasks remain
suspended in mid-air, and may, for all we know, lack a foundation of
any kind. Only transcendental anthropology-or, if that phrase seems
too imposing, only an account of human nature-can provide the
ground on which to stand. What does an inspection of our human
nature tell us about the possibility of rhetoric, understood in the naive
but widely accepted and even honorable way that Gorgias views it?
v.
We live in a state of longing. We begin to long the moment we are
born and do not stop until we die. At first, we long for food and
freedom from pain, then for affection, recognition and approval. Later,
we long for wealth, fame, knowledge, salvation, and love. For brief
periods we may experience a suspension of longing, for example, at
moments of sexual or contemplative bliss. But always we return to a
state oflonging, from which there can be no permanent escape so long
as we live.
The forms and objects of human longing are varied. Indeed, they
appear to be without limit. We seem capable of longing for anything,
and in every possible way. The plasticity ofhuman longing is one of the
characteristics that distinguishes it most sharply from the canalized
desires of other living creatures, whose yearnings, however intense,
generally follow a fixed routine.
Yet despite their protean variety, human longings can be gathered
into different groups or classes with distinct, ifoverlapping, traits. They
can be arranged in various class~fications and schemes. One of the
earliest and most suggestive typologies of human longing is to be found
in Plato's Symposium, in the famous speech of the priestess Diotima, from
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whom Socrates, who repeats the speech, claims to have learned
everything he knows about 10ve.31
Diotima associates longing with mortality, the condition ofliving in
time. All mortal creatures, she says, exist in a state oflonging. Being
mortal, they are vulnerable and incomplete, and hence always in need
of security and support. They are always struggling to escape their
predicament of neediness and risk. They are always searching for
fulfillment. But within the horizon of mortal life, true and lasting
fulfillment is unattainable; that is precisely what mortality means.
Hence, to the extent that mortal beings long for fulfillment, they long for
something beyond the bounds of mortality itself. They long for
immortality, and every mortal longing is at bottom, Diotima says, a
longing for just this. In the case of human beings, the longing for
immortality assumes three basic fonns. First, there is the sexual longing
for physical union. The satisfaction of this longing produces a momen-
tary calm that anticipates, as Freud observed, the pennanent peace of
death.32 For an instant, at least, it relieves us of the nervous neediness
ofmortal life, and the natural consequence of sexual union (in the case
ofmen and women) is the procreation ofchildren, who--as the blurred
images of their parents--enable them to go on living, in a fashion, after
they have died.
.Second, there is the longing to share in the building and improvement
ofcities. Diotima does not give this longing a name, but we might call
it the political longing. It is the longing to be associated with, and have
some role in, the ongoing business of civic life-of lawmaking and
adjudication, of deliberation about the just and the unjust-that
constitutes the continuing thread which links one generation of citizens
to the next. By enacting laws that oudive them, their authors leave an
image of themselves behind, and achieve a kind of life after death, just
as the parents of a child do, though the image that citizens leave is a
spiritual one-a rule, an idea, a commitment-rather than the physical
image ofa face.
Finally, there is the longing for knowledge or wisdom--philosophy,
in the literal sense. Here, on earth, Diotima says, we are constandy
buffeted by different impressions and feelings. The mortal realm in
which we live is a great theater of sights and sounds, of tumultuous
comings and goings, and in it we must somehow find our way amidst the
confusing clash offleeting appearances. We long to do this, to find the
31. See PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 201d-212c (Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff trans., Hackett
Publ'g Co. 1989).
32. See SIGMUND FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEAsURE PRiNCIPLE 56-58 (James Strachey ed. & trans.,
1961).
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secret of true knowledge that will release us from the mistakes and
misunderstandings to which, as finite beings, we are subject. But this
secret cannot be discovered within the realm of time. True knowledge
must be changeless, and can only be of what is changeless. True
knowledge is the apprehension of an immortal idea by an immortal
mind-or more precisely, in our case, by the deathless power of thought
that is joined with other, mortal elements in the composite human soul.
Philosophy is the preparation for, and active pursuit of, true knowledge
of this kind. It is the pursuit of a changeless benchmark by which to
judge the everchanging spectacle of time, and its energy comes, like that
of sex and politics, from the longing for immortality that Diotima
describes as the most basic fact of human life.
In her speech,· Diotima not only identifies three forms of human
longing, she ranks them as well. Sex is the lowest priority, politics next,
and philosophy belongs at the top. The reason for the ranking is clear.
If every human longing is a longing for immortality, then different
longings may be ranked according to their prospects offulfilling the one
desire ofwhich they are all expressions, and that in tum depends upon
the relative immunity of their objects to the effects of time. Sex is
fleeting, children survive a bit longer, and cities longer still. But only the
truth lasts forever, only truth is perfectly invulnerable to the shifting
fortunes of time. Only the possession of truth, therefore, can completely
satisfy the longing for immortality, a longing that sex and politics also
gratify but in less lasting ways.
One might challenge this ranking, which expresses in a forceful way
what Nietzsche called the "prejudices ofphilosophers."33 But I shall not
do so. I want instead to examine more closely the second ofDiotima's
three forms of human longing, the one I have called political longing.
This is the longing that gives rise to the world that Gorgias inhabits, the
world of courts and assemblies, and like Gorgias himself, who stands
between the higher philosophical plane represented by Socrates and the
lower appetitive one that Callicles so unashamedly defends, the political
longing that occupies the middle position in Diotima's scheme also
.stands between a higher order of philosophy and a lower one of
appetite. This structural parallel is more than a curiosity. It suggests a
means ofapproach to the question of how the independence ofpolitics
and law, and of the craft of rhetoric, can be explained and defended. I
shall outline the argument briefly and then develop it in more detail.
The argument rests on four connected claims.
33. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GoOD AND EVIL pt. I, at 5 (Helen Zimmem trans., George
Allen & Unwin LTD 1923) (1907).
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First, longing is an essential fact ofhuman life. A life without longing
is incomprehensible to us. Ifwe subtract longing from our lives, we are
left with something unrecognizably different from the lives we have.
Second, whatever the direction or object ofhuman longing, it always
assumes a distincdy human form. Our sexual longings, for example,
have an imaginative component that distinguishes them from the
instinctual sex drives of other living creatures. Sex, for us, is always
fantasy and role play. The human longing for knowledge likewise
possesses a special character. Because we have bodies, our perceptions
are clouded, our beliefs are unstable and the effort to think is constandy
being interrupted by the demands of bodily need.34 Sex begins in the
body, but human sex is imaginative, and to that extent unbound by the
iron constraints of physical life. Philosophy begins in the imagina-
tion-in the power to see one thing as an image of another, the source
of all abstraction35-but the philosophy that human beings practice is
subject to the limits of bodily existence, and is always distracted.
Generalizing, we might say that the human condition is one of embod-
ied imagination.36 This is a condition unique to us, and it gives every
branch of human longing a singular form. When we try to imagine
what human life would be like if our longings had a different form-if
our sex were more like that ofanimals or our thinking more like that of
gods--we arrive at a blank, at an incomprehensible emptiness, that can
only be fllled by secredy importing back the very features of human
longing we have subtracted, the ones that give our longings their
uniquely human shape.
Third, imaginative sex and distracted philosophy-the most potent
forms of human longing-can exist only within a frame of worldly
institutions that provide constraints for the one and continuity for the
other. Together, these institutions comprise the realm of human
34. jacob Klein repeats the following story about Aristotle, told by Diogenes Laertius:
When hewent to bed, so the story goes, he used to hold in his hand a sphere of bronze-the
sphere representing the whole world, I presume--while on the floor, close to the bed,
beneath his extended hand, lay a pan. As soon as Aristotle would fall asleep, the sphere
would slip out of his hand, fallon that pan, and the ensuing noise would awaken him. This
procedure was apparently repeated over and over again. Aristotle could hardly have
survived such an ordeal for any length of time. But no story could more aptly relate his
claim to immortality.
jacob Klein, Aristotle: An In/J'rJduction, in ANCIENTS AND MODERNS 68 (Joseph Cropsey ed., 1964). Or, we
might add, no story could better illustrate the distracted character of all human philosophizing.
35. See PLATO, REPuBuc 51Oa-511e (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., Norton & Co.
1985). See aLrojACOB K1.EIN, A COMMENfARY ON PLATO'S MENO 112-25 (1965). CompareKANT,supra
note 30, at AI40-42/B 179-83 (discussing the transcendental schema of the imagination).
36. See general!J MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (Colin Smith
trans., Routledge & Kegan Paul 1962).
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civilization, and though both sex and philosophy point away from this
realm toward an ecstasy that lies beyond its borders, each can assume
a human form only within the supportive frame of civilized life. Each
is anchored in a middle world of durable but impermanent institutions
whose rhythms and requirements are less ecstatic than the longings for
sex and knowledge. These institutions create the space within which the
pursuit ofecstasy-the goal ofgods and animals too-1irst appears in its
uniquely human form.
More lasting than the human beings who live within them, though
subject to the same forces ofdecay, the institutions ofcivilization provide
the stage on which humanity appears, and outside their sheltering space
there can be no expression or recognition of the special being we
possess. There can be no human life. The love of lawmaking must
therefore be thought of not merely as an intermediate step in the
evolution ofhuman longing from its lowest to its highest form. It must
also be understood as the love of humanity itself, whose distinctive
character only comes to light in the middle realm of laws and institu-
tions where we alone are able to show off and see the special sort of
being we possess, thereby satisfying the urge to self-display that every
living creature feels. Aristotle's famous remark that man is "by nature
an animal intended to live in a polis" should be interpreted in this
light.37
Fourth, the existence of a realm of laws and institutions, however
necessary to the exhibition of our human nature, is itself an artificial
a<;hievement. For this world to come into being, and to endure for a
meaningful time, the natural drive toward self-preservation must be
contained and redirected. The passion we all feel for our selves must be
fastened onto a different and larger object. .Self-love must be trans-
formed into patriotic valor, the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the
sake ofone's city. This necessary transformation is possible because the
passion of self-love, which every animal feels, includes, in the case of
human beings, a longing for recognition and respect, from which the
civic passions ofpride, shame, glory and the like all take their start.38
The public world oflaws and institutions toward which these passions
are directed resembles its individual human inhabitants in one impor-
tant respect. Like them, it too exists in time and is subject to decay. No
law or institution lasts forever, and the public space that any system of
laws creates can be kept open only through constant maintenance and
repair, like a garden whose order can be preserved only by constantly
37. ARISTOTLE, THE Pouncs 1253a 2 (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
38. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT pt. B.IV.A, at 111-19 (AV. Miller trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1977).
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rechanneling the forces of nature that surround it and flow through it.
The mortality of laws and institutions, like that of men·and women, is
a consequence of the fact that they too possess what Aristode called a
"composite" being, one part of which is always an idea (ofjustice or
virtue or truth), and the other an embodiment of this idea in perishable
practices and living (hence dying) human beings.39
But if the composite being of laws and institutions-of political
regimes, in Aristode's sense-means that they too must eventually
perish, their lifespan is potentially longer than that of individual men
and women, and indeed has no fIxed limit at all. Every regime must fail
at some point, but there is no telling how long it can survive. Laws and
institutions, mortal though they be, possess an indefInite durability
because they are embodied in practices that are transmissible from one
generation to the next, and because their composite existence does not
depend upon the identity of the individual human beings who happen
at any given moment to be their carriers (in contrast to the composite
being ofa single man, which always dissolves when his body dies).
For a public world oflaws and institutions to exist at all, the natural
passion of individual self-preservation must be artifIcially redirected
toward a larger and more lasting object. This is possible because the
human passion ofself-preservation is nascendy political, including, as it
does, a longing for respect as well as life; and because the different
character of their composition gives political regimes a duration that
exceeds, potentially at least, the lifespan of individual human beings.
Because every regime possesses this potential durability, an appeal to its
good is always an appeal to something that transcends the individual
good ofits members, whose self-interest can last no longer than they do.
This is a logical and not merely factual feature ofall such appeals, even
those that are made to individuals who for accidental reasons happen to
oudive the regimes to which they belong. .The transcendence of self-
interest, mirrowly understood, is built into the very structure ofpolitical
argument, which thus cannot be reduced to a form offlattery that caters
to self-interest alone.
But because laws and institutions are mortal composites, existing in
time and subject like every other fInite being to the forces ofdecay, their
good can never be as clear or perfect as the good of things that exist
outside of time, like the objects of mathematics. Because every regime
is an embodied idea, its values must always have some local coloration.
They must always have an element of particularity, of historicity,
associated with the peculiar circumstances of their career in time. Like
39. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 37, at 1274b 40.
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bodies of other sorts, moreover, the body politic can only be viewed
from a perspective, so that judgments about its good must always be
perspectival and hence controversial (in contrast to judgments about
mathematical objects, which are not viewed perspectivally at all). This
is the source ofthe error and deception that accompany political debate,
of the mistakes we make about the good of regimes, and the fraud that
is sometimes practiced on us. For with the perspectivity and hence
partiality ofpolitical judgment comes, inevitably, the risk of mistaking
a part for the whole and of deliberately being misled into errors of
perception and judgment. It is a risk that comes with the territory.
Our humanity comes to light only within the horizon of the public
world. Only here can we show and see the special being we possess.
But the public world must be built and then guarded~ This requires an
appeal to the impressively durable but still finite good of laws and
institutions-a good which transcends that of our separate selves but
always retains a local flavor, is subject to permanent debate, and about
which we may be mistaken and even deceived. Building on the
nascently political longing for respect, appeals of this sort seek by
artifical means to convert our natural passion of self-preservation into
the spirit of citizenship, on which the survival of the public world
depends. More than a flatterer but less than a mathematician, a molder
of passions with the power to cheat and dissemble, the practitioner of
this art is the builder of the middle realm in which our humanity first
comes to light. Never complete and always dangerous, his work is
essential to the construction ofa public world and hence to the display
of our human being. This is the work of rhetoric, and Gorgias-who
stands between Socrates and Callicles-is the representative of all who
perform it.
VI.
Every step in this argument needs further support. Indeed, one might
object that the argument I have sketched is not really an argument at all,
but merely an argument-form: a description of the form an argument
in defense of the dignity ofrhetoric might take, were such an argument
to be constructed. This is a serious objection, and I shall try to make a
few of the claims on which my argument is based clearer and more
convincing.
I have claimed that the lives of human beings, like those of other
animals, are lived in a state of longing, but that the longings we
experience-the highest as well as the lowest-always assume a special
human form. This is true, I have said, of the longings for both sex and
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knowledge, each of which, in a different way, seeks a consummation
beyond the routines ofeveryday life. Consider human sexuality first.
Sexual fulfillment is transporting. It is literally out of this world. The
human longing for sexual fulflliment is a longing for ecstasy, in the
original sense of the word. In this respect, it is no different from the
sexual longing that other living beings experience. It is merely one
expression of the desire for ecstasy that powers the species-life ofevery
living thing on earth. But in our case, the longing for sexual fulfillment
always possesses an imaginative component which, so far as we can tell,
is missing from the sex lives ofother animals. It is always-to borrow
an expression of Jonathan Lear's-a "minded" longing shaped by
fantasies ofone sort or another.40
Early in the development of his psychoanalytic theory, Freud
remarked that he was getting used to the idea that every sex act between
human beings always has at least four partners.41 His point was that sex,
for us, is never a thoughtless thing. It is always a drama, an inventive
play With characters and a narrative line, as the artistry of our dream
lives reveals. Freud is sometimes accused of lowering the dignity of
mind by reducing it to a sexual drive. The truth is that he raised the
dignity of sex-ofhuman sex-by showing it is always minded.
How our fantasy lives begin and what forces shape their development
are immensely difficult questions. Freud devoted a lifetime ofgenius to
them, and one certainly may quarrel with many ofhis answers. But the
great point he established beyond dispute is that the imaginative
dimension of our sexuality accounts for all its most distinctive features:
its susceptibility to. neurotic distortion, its expression in traits of
character, and its hopeful, ifproblematic, relation to love. These make
human sexuality interesting. They make it human. Ifour longing for
sexual fulfillment were a mindless longing, as it is for other animals,
these features would disappear and our sex lives no longer be recogniz-
ably human. But that is something we cannot even conceive, any more
than we can really conceive (except in the form of a fantasy that itself is
the product of imagination) the sex life ofa dog.42
Sexual longing is a ubiquitous feature of human life. So too is the
longing for knowledge from which science and philosophy take their
start. Aristotle begins his treatise on metaphysics by observing that "[a]ll
40. SeeJONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL (1998); Set
aLro EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF THE SUBIJME
AND BEAUTIFUL 29 (Adam Phillips ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
41. Set generaJ!y, FREUD, supra note 32.
42. See Thomas Nagel, Uo7lat Is It LiJr.e to & aBat?, 83 THE PHIL. REv. No.4 at 435·50 (1974); Set
aLro BURKE, supra note 40, at 29.
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men by nature desire understanding," and as evidence of this points to
the fact that we enjoy looking at things not just because it is useful to do
so, but also because the visual apprehension of the world is a pleasure
in itself-a sensual pleasure that anticipates the joy ofknowledge.43 The
longing for this joy is not something only a few intellectuals experience.
It is a drive that every man and woman feels. Each of us is curious
about the world and our place in it, and this universal curiosity, which
begins at birth, can be satisfied only by knowledge. Curiosity is the
longing for knowledge, for the joyful release from ignorance that
knowledge brings, and like the longing for sexual union it is with us the
whole of our lives.
It is also a longing with a distinctive human form. Here the appropri-
ate contrast is not (as in the case ofsex) downward to other animals, but
rather upward to God. We imagine God's existence to be one of
absolute bliss, the bliss ofperfect and continuous knowledge. The joy
we imagine God experiencing is the joy of errorless, endless knowing.
This is the picture of divine experience that both Plato and Aristode
present, and that later Christian writers endorse as well.44 Our human
thinking, unlike God's, sometimes leads to wrong results. It is also
always subject to interruption. Every human inquiry runs the risk of
mistake, and no train of thought can be sustained indefinitely by any
single person: death stops each of us from inquiring further, and while
we live our bodily needs with their urgent demands constandy interrupt
the process of thinking. Human thought is always distracted, and the
idea of a divine mode of thinking unburdened by error, hunger and
sleep is as incomprehensible to us as the idea of sex without fantasies.
The idea of divine thought does not describe an experience we can
imagine. It defines the limits of the experience of thinking we actually
have and it reminds us-in the same way the idea of animal sex
does-of the distinctiveness of human longing and human life. The
special forms which the longings for sex and knowledge assume in our
lives define the distinctive kind ofbeing we possess -our human being,
which we display within a space whose horizons are marked by the idea
of God, on the one hand, and that of mindless sex on the other.
We can no more escape these forms than we can jump over our
shadows. But the very qualities that give our human longings for sexual
and intellectual joy their distinctive shape also condition the pursuit of
these ecstatic states on a world of stabilizing institutions. This world
43. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 980a 20 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., Ind. Univ. Press 1966).
44. See, e.g., PlATO, TiMAEUSAND CRI1lAS 47b-c (A.E. Taylor trans., Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1929);
ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, at 1074b 15·I075a 5; SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, The Summa ThetJlogica, in 17
GREAT BOOKS OF THE WORLD, Aquinas I, Q, 14, art. I, at 75-76 (MortimerJ. Adler ed., 1990) (1952).
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provides a guard against the destructive power of the first pursuit and
the possibility of collaboration and continuity in the second. Without
the conventions ofcivilized life, our longing for sexual fulfillment would
destroy us and our desire for knowledge could never take root.
Together these conventions comprise the world of law and culture,
whose existence is necessary to the survival of our deepest longings in
their distinctive human form-and hence to the survival of our
humanity itself.
The fantasies that give human sexual longing its "minded" character
themselves presuppose, ofcourse, a complex system oflegal and cultural
arrangements. The Oedipus complex is a family drama, and the family
is a legal and cultural institution. If the fantasy projections of the
Oedipus complex, and their many permutations, are not thinkable
outside of family life, then they are not thinkable outside the realm of
civilization. Civilization is thus not only a source of "discontent"-of
repression and neurosis.45 It is also the source of the mindedness that
gives human sexuality its distinctive form in the first place.
But the point I want to emphasize concerns not the origins of our
minded sexuality, but its uniquely destructive power. There is some-
thing destructive in every sexual longing. Every act of sexual gratifica-
tion involves the overcoming of an other's resistance. Sex always
involves a conquest, even when each party is both conqueror and
conquered. But the mindlessness of animal sex puts a limit to its
destructive force. There is only so much damage the sexual longings of
animals can do. In our case, however, the natural longing for sexual
fulfillment, which we share with other animals, is amplified by fantasies
that give it a greater, indeed potentially limitless, field. It is amplified by
mind, and the destructiveness that belongs to sex is amplified with it: to
the point where the sexual longing of a single human being--of an
Adolf Hitler, for example--may be capable of fulfillment only by the
destruction ofevery other person on earth. The imaginativeness ofour
sexual longings-the very thing that makes them human-thus
unchains a power of destruction which threatens to destroy humanity
itself. Only civilization can save us from this power. Only law and the
habit ofobeying it can protect us against the destructiveness ofsex when
it is freed from all natural limits by the liberating power of mind. Only
the organized use offorce in defense oflaw can make the world safe for
human sex by creating a protected space in which it is possible for
fantasies to flourish without killing us all.
45. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVlUZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 86-98 Goan Riviere trans., 1958).
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The civilizing world oflaw and culture is necessary to the flourishing
of our longing for knowledge as well. In this case, the necessity is
dictated not by the destructive force of the desire but by its weakness
instead. We want to understand the world--we have a natural curiosity
about it-but our efforts to satisfy this curiosity are subject to error and
interruption. We all make mistakes of perception and judgment, and
constantly are distracted from the pursuit of knowledge by our bodily
needs. We also all die, and when we do, our individual inquiries into
the world end with us.
But we have discovered a means ofovercoming these limitations. By
comparing our judgments with those of others we can avoid mistakes
and by linking our separate efforts to understand the world we are able
to sustain the pursuit of knowledge without interruption by sleep or
death. Philosophy seeks to discover the truth about the world. It begins
(as Socrates observes) by distinguishing between truth and opin-
ion-between the true order of things, and what people say about it
when they talk. But (as Socrates also observes) philosophy itself is a
conversational activity, one we pursue in collaboration with others.46
This collaboration provides the best means we have of checking our
judgments and distinguishing truth from opinion. It is a collaboration,
moreover, that is not limited to those who are living. Aristotle devotes
the first Book of the Metaphysics to a review of the theories held by earlier
thinkers, predecessors in a tradition of inquiry that remains alive even
today.47. Those who work in this tradition are not historians. They do
not seek merely to understand the history of their discipline. They want
to know the timeless truth about the world. But their pursuit of the truth
is itself an historical entefErise, sustained over many generations, with
a cumulative record ofdiscoveries and disputes, and by participating in
it we escape the temporal limits to which our individual pursuit of the
truth would otherwise be subject.
Philosophy and science are social activities involving a collaboration
among the living and the dead. They are conversations that go on
without interruption and that possess a power of self-correction greater
than anyone person's. If such conversations were impossible, or if their
results could not be recorded and preserved, the human longing for
knowledge would be shut up within limits so narrow that it could never
achieve satisfaction. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how, under these
circumstances, our longing for knowledge could find any expression at
all.
46. See PLATO, supra note 2, at 487e.
47. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 43, at 983 b-993 a.
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If it is to flourish, this longing must be anchored in a collaborative
conversation, and the very existence of this conversation demands a
wide range ofcivilizing institutions-books, schools, and other means of
communication, as well as the leisure time to use them. The human
longing to understand the world is plagued by deficiencies and distrac-
tions. These can be overcome only through a collective effort of
criticism and memory, which in tum requires an apparatus ofcommuni-
cation and conservation, and a durable frame oflaws and institutions to
support it. Outside this frame there can be no philosophy or science,
and outside philosophy and science the human longing for knowl-
edge-for the joy of understanding--remains stillborn.
The desire to know, like the desire for sexual union, innately is within
us. But neither desire can be fully or permanendy satisfied within the
limits of human existence. It is our fate to long for joys that are
sustainable only outside the bounds ofhuman nature-the same nature
that causes us to long for these joys in the first place. We long for
ecstasy, for a release from loneliness and ignorance, for a consummation
that lies beyond the world, as it is given to us in experience. But we are
always disappointed in this longing, and our disappointment is as much
a part ofhuman nature as the longing itself. That is the first paradox of
our condition.
A second paradox is the dependence of our ecstatic longings for
knowledge and sex, which aim at a rapturous fulfillment beyond the
world, on worldly institutions. These longings are themselves indifferent
to the claims ofpolitics and law. The care of this world is not their aim.
Indeed, nothing could be further from the pursuit of bliss, sexual or
philosophical, than the tedious business ofkeeping a political regime in
good repair. The first aims at something absolute and timeless; the
second is concerned with what is temporary and impelfect. For a
person seeking ecstasy, the quotidian concerns of the lawyer or
politician-so compromised and transient by comparison with what he
wants-are at best an irrelevance and at worst an obstacle to be
overcome or broken down. Yet the ecstatic longings for sex and
knowledge, which are antithetical to the workaday spirit ofpolitics and
law, are by another paradox of our nature dependent upon them, for
without the frame of ordered durability that politics and law provide,
neither longing can be sustained in a human form-the first because of
its destructiveness, which law resists, and the second on account of its
deficiencies, for which the institutions ofcivilized life (made possible by
law and politics) provide the only remedy we possess.
We long, with disappointment, for joys beyond the world. These
longings make us human. But they are also sustainable only in a frame
ofworldly institutions to which our yearnings for ecstasy are indifferent
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and sometimes hostile. The lawyers and politicians who, with all their
petty concerns and trivial ambitions, make it their business to preserve
these institutions, are the keepers of the space in which our humanity
finds room for expression. They are the custodians of the realm in
which our humanity endures. Our humanity is something wonderful
and strange-a mixture of ambition and limitation that produces a
permanent state ofdisappointment from which every distinctive human
suffering and achievement derives. . We can never be sufficiendy
detached from our humanity to judge it good or bad.48 We can never
pass sentence on it from beyond, much as we sometimes seem to want
to. We can only enact or display it, and like other living things, we have
a passion for self-display. We enjoy showing offas much as we enjoy the
pleasure ofsight. We are performers as well as spectators, exhibitionists
as well as voyeurs, and the pleasure oflooking--from which all science
and philosophy derive-is matched, for us, by the pleasure of being
seen, to which every demand for recognition, of whatever degree of
refinement, must ultimately be traced.49 Those who guard the world of
laws and institutions-the lawyers and the politicians-create a theater
for this spectacle of self-display and give us the space we need to show
all the amazing sides of what Sophocles righdy calls us-the strangest
and most wonderful creature on earth.50
About the work of lawyers and politicians I shall make only two
concluding observations. The first concerns their use ofspeech.
The most urgent task oflawyers and politicians is to nurture a loyalty
to the public good. Patriotism is a condition ofpolitical life. A political
regime can endure only in case some of its members put the regime's
existence ahead of their own-only in case they are willing to die for it.
But patriotism is an artificial sentiment that must be cultivated through
a process of transference: by causing the natural attachment we feel to
ourselves to be transferred to the abstraction of the state. This is
accomplished by means of emotional appeals which take advantage of
the fact that many of our most primitive feelings of self-regard (anger
48. Sa NIETZSCHE, supra note 24, at 474.
Judgments,judgments ofvalue, concerning life, for or against it, can, in the end, never be
true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy ofconsideration only as symptoms;
in themselves such judgments are stupidities. One must by aU means stretch out one's
fingers and make the attempt to grasp this amazing finesse, tIuU 1M valw iii life cannot be
estirnokd. Not by the living, for they are an interested party, even a bone ofcontention, and
not judges; not by the dead, for a different reason.
Id. (emphasis in original).
49. I HANNAH ARENDT, THE1JFEOFTHEMIND: THINKING 19-23 (Harcourt BraceJovanovich
1978) (1971).
50... SOPHOCLES, Antigone in ANTIGONE OF SOPHOCLES 29-30 (F. Kinchin Smith trans., Sidgwick
&Jackson Ltd. 1950).
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and pride, for example) have a built-in reference to the beliefs and
attitudes ofother people and are therefore nascendy political, so that the
anger a man feels, say, toward his personal enemies can serve as a model
and inspiration for the anger an orator wishes to arouse in him toward
an enemy of the state.
All of this I have said before. What I want to emphasize now is the
role that speech plays in this process ofemotional transference. Lawyers
and politicians work by means ofwords. Their art is above all an art of
speech. Often, of course, they use speech as an instrument of
reason-to clarify ideas, evaluate arguments, and keep emotions at a
distance. Often the words that lawyers and politicians use are meant to
cool our feelings, not to enflame them. But sometimes they are intended
to arouse our emotions rather than to educate our minds, .and the most
effective legal and political arguments always do both at once.
This would be impossible ifwords could not arouse us, ifmere words
could not make us angry or proud. But they can, and frequendy do. A
dog cannot be insulted or flattered, but we are able to change a person's
mood merely by speaking certain words to him. A single word can
cause a man to lose his mind. Speech is the highway ofphilosophy and
science, but it is also an instrument ofpassion, with the power both to
express and to change our feelings. In its role as a tool of reason, speech
provides the means for rational deliberation in politics and law. In its
role as an agent of feeling, it promotes the emotional transference on
which all political loyalties, and hence all politics, depend. Every
political regime subscribes to some conception ofjustice and at the same
time demands a certain degree of emotional commitment from its
citizens~ Speech is the flexible medium in which lawyers and politicians
reason about the one and cultivate the other. It connects our hearts and
minds, and the art of making this connection is the art of rhetoric.
Second, only a real system of laws and institutions can create the
worldly space we need to display our humanity. An imaginary regime,
no matter how perfect, is incapable ofdoing this. Ideal systems oflaw
and government lack the power to constrain the extravagant destructive-
ness ofhuman sexuality; for this, real violence is needed. And they lack
the capacity to sustain the apparatus of civilized life, for which real
means of preservation are required. Law and politics can meet these
needs only when they come down to earth, out of the heaven ofideas,
and assume a concrete form. An ideal regime, like the system ofperfect
justice that Socrates and his companions construct in the Republic, is
powerless to perform these functions.
Ofcourse, every real political system contains ideal elements. Every
actual system oflaw and government is oriented toward some concep-
tion of justice or goodness or beauty. But what makes it an actual
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system, as opposed to a merely ideal one, is the mixture of this concep-
tion with other elements of a contingent and corruptible kind. These
give the ideal a worldly shape that enables the laws and institutions
based upon it to become a real force in the lives of men and women.
But existing political regimes, which acquire the power to provide a
stable home for human beings only through this mixture of accidental
elements, are compromised by these elements themselves, whose
introduction touches every actual regime with the possibility of decay
and clouds the judgment of its defenders, exposing them to risks of
misperception and mistake which the inventors of ideal regimes,
uncontaminated by accidents of any kind, never encounter.
Those who choose politics as a vocation are exposed to very great
risks. There is the risk they may be mistaken about important matters
of fact, or fail to see how their ideals can best be advanced under the
murky circumstances in which they are compelled to go forward. There
is the risk that, in pursuit of their ideals, they may do great harm to
other people. There is the risk they may be corrupted by material
advantage and cease to care about their ideals at all. There is the risk
that political .realities will make them hardhearted, and immune to
human suffering. And there is the risk that, after years ofconscientious
service, the regime to which they have devoted their lives may be
destroyed or dissolved, forcing them to conclude that their lives have
been wasted. Any of these things can happen to the person who makes
politics his career, and they can happen because real laws and institu-
tions are a composite of ideals, on the one hand, and contingent factors
on the other, whose presence clouds the mind, corrupts the heart and
places every regime under a suspended sentence ofdeath.
This is why some flee from politics, into the riskless realm ofphiloso-
phy, or the immediacy of erotic love. In each it is possible to feel,
momentarily at least, transported beyond the world ofeveryday political
life, with its humdrum preoccupations and silly distractions and endless
opportunities for mistake and deception. The otherworldly satisfactions
of philosophy and love can seem attractive by comparison, and it is
reasonable to assume that so long as there are human beings on earth,
some at least will prefer the pursuit of ecstasy to the work of politics,
which Max Weber described as "a slow boring of hard boards."51
But I have argued that this pursuit itself can be sustained only in a
frame of worldly institutions that provides a home on earth for our
ecstatic longings. We long for joy, for a consummating union that
51. Max Weber, Polilics As a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER 128 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946).
HeinOnline -- 67 U. Cin. L. Rev. 709 1998-1999
1999] THE ART OF RHETORIC 709
transcends everything familiar and worldly. But by a strange paradox
ofour nature this longing demands the very thing it abjures: a world of
laws and institutions sturdy enough to provide a stage for its display.
Those who build this stage have a risky assignment. They are always at
risk for their souls. Theirs is a dirty business, full of danger and
subversion. But ifwe reflect on the gift they give us-the creation of a
space to show and see ourselves-may we not agree that: in this dirty
business there is something to be admired? May we not conclude that
there is something for which to be thankful? Should we not concede
that the rhetorician, mocked by the champions of both thought and
power, has a respectable craft of his own, one that makes its own
essential contribution to humanity? Can we not even see in the
. stumbling and inarticulate figure of Gorgias a hero of sorts, worthy of
praise from all lovers ofjoy, who dwell in the house that he builds?
A new and more sympathetic study of rhetoric might begin at this
point.
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